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Abstract: I analyse the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining 
between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is 
over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) 
between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When 
bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces 
downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall 
welfare. In both cases, standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: 
less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and 
society as a whole. 
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1. Introduction. 
The traditional view that competition among firms is beneficial for welfare has 
recently been challenged by a number of theoretical studies. One line of research 
has focused on models of semi-collusion (see, for instance, Fershtman and Gandal 
1994; Brod and Shivakumar 1999; Fershtman and Pakes 2000). This work has 
shown that when (i) firms can collude on a short-run decision variable such as 
price or output but not on long-run decision variables and (ii) collusion on the 
short-run decision variable increases the firms’ incentives to make cost-reducing 
or quality-enhancing investments, then the welfare gains from these investments 
may more than compensate for the welfare losses due to the reduction of output.  
 A second line of research has explored the links between the intensity of 
price competition and market structure (Selten 1984, Sutton 1991, Symeonidis 
2002a). This literature has emphasised that an increase in the intensity of 
competition generally leads to a more concentrated market structure. Although 
these studies have not been mainly concerned with welfare results, a natural 
implication is that welfare may be higher when competition is not intense. This 
will happen if the welfare gain due to the increase in product variety more than 
compensates for the welfare loss caused by the fall in output. 
 Finally, a third literature, starting with Horn and Wolinsky (1988), has 
examined the effects of buyers’ countervailing power and/or downstream mergers 
in vertically related industries or in the presence of unions. Most of these studies 
have found that an increase in buyers’ countervailing power or a downstream 
merger will reduce the prices charged by suppliers, although the welfare effects 
are less clear. For instance, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Dobson and Waterson 
(1997) and Chen (2003) have found that, when all the downstream firms bargain 
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with a single supplier, countervailing power will have positive effects for 
consumers only when downstream competition is strong. Among those papers that 
allow for more than one upstream agents, Ziss (1995) has found that a downstream 
merger between duopolists will lead to higher industry output when upstream 
suppliers set two-part tariffs, while Lommerud et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2006) have 
shown that certain types of mergers among a subset of downstream firms in an 
oligopoly where uniform input prices are set by upstream agents will reduce input 
prices and may also increase social welfare.1
 The present paper extends the literature on the effects of competition in 
vertically related industries or in the presence of unions in a number of ways. I 
construct a model which is not restricted to the effects of mergers but analyses 
more generally the welfare effects of changes in the intensity of competition 
between downstream firms in the presence of upstream suppliers or unions. In 
particular, I allow for more general forms of cooperation between downstream 
firms, including cross-ownerships and imperfect cooperation. Second, I allow for 
bargaining between downstream firms and their respective upstream agents (firms 
or unions). My definition of bargaining covers the special cases where one or the 
other of the parties has all the bargaining power and effectively chooses 
unilaterally the input price or two-part tariff. Third, I analyse a range of bargaining 
                                                 
1 There is also a related literature on the effects of upstream mergers in vertically 
related industries. This again begins with Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and includes 
Ziss (1995), Chen and Ross (2003), O’Brien and Shaffer (2005), and Milliou and 
Petrakis (2005). On the other hand, Inderst and Wey (2002, 2003) and Inderst and 
Shaffer (2004) focus primarily on the effects of mergers in vertically related industries 
on innovation and product variety. 
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structures, including bargaining over a uniform input price and bargaining over a 
two-part tariff. Finally, I provide a comprehensive analysis of welfare results. 
In my benchmark model, two downstream firms compete in a horizontally 
differentiated product market. Prior to that, each of the two firms bargains with its 
respective upstream agent and the bargaining process is represented by the 
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Two important assumptions of the model 
are that each downstream firm and its upstream agent are locked into bilateral 
relations and that there is no cooperation at the bargaining stage. The first of these 
assumptions is discussed more extensively in the concluding section. The second 
is consistent with the idea (explored in the semi-collusion literature) that 
competition is often less intense in short-run decision variables than in long-run 
decision variables (see section 2 for details). Note that cooperation at the 
bargaining stage will be even harder to achieve when the downstream firms are 
located in different countries. 
In this context the bargained input prices depend, among other things, on 
the competitive regime facing downstream firms. More specifically, irrespective of 
whether bargaining is over a linear tariff or a two-part tariff, the bargained input 
price is lower the lower the intensity of competition between downstream firms. 
Moreover, when bargaining is over a uniform input price, downstream profits are 
higher, upstream utility lower and, under certain circumstances, consumer surplus 
and total welfare higher under joint profit maximisation than in the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, the positive welfare effects 
of joint profit maximisation by downstream firms are even more pronounced. In 
this case we obtain a complete reversal of the standard results of oligopoly theory: 
less intense competition between downstream firms reduces both their profits and 
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the utility of the upstream agents, and it increases consumer surplus and social 
welfare.  
Note that although joint profit maximisation will be usually described in 
this paper as an extreme case of ‘soft’ competition among firms, it can also be 
seen as the result of a merger or strategic alliance between the downstream firms, 
provided that both varieties of the product are produced2 and the upstream agents 
remain independent and each locked into relations with one of the formerly 
independent downstream firms (see Lommerud et al. 2005a, 2006). However, an 
important implication of interpreting joint profit maximisation as the result of a 
merger is that the payoff that the downstream firm seeks to maximise in the 
bargaining stage of the game needs to be modified to the extent that the merger is 
assumed to occur prior to the bargaining stage. I discuss in the concluding remarks 
(and elaborate in the Appendix) this version of the model and compare it with the 
benchmark model. It turns out that a downstream merger between duopolists can 
be beneficial for consumers and for society as a whole when bargaining is over 
linear tariffs (but not when bargaining is over two-part tariffs). 
Some of the themes that I analyse here are also explored in a number of 
other papers. Ziss (1995) has shown that under certain conditions a downstream 
merger will lead to higher output when upstream suppliers set two-part tariffs. 
However, there is no bargaining in his model and no analysis of the profitability 
effects of such a merger. I examine these issues in detail and I also provide results 
for a range of bargaining structures and a continuum of competitive regimes. In 
fact, my results differ from those obtained by Ziss because of the introduction of 
                                                 
2 See Inderst and Shaffer (2004) for a model where a downstream merger leads to a 
reduction in product variety. 
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bargaining. Lommerud et al. (2005a, 2006) find that a merger among a subset of 
downstream firms leads to lower input prices and may increase social welfare. 
However, they do not consider bargaining over input prices in their model and do 
not analyse two-part tariffs: input suppliers unilaterally set a linear tariff.3 
Moreover, since they are primarily interested in the profitability effect of mergers, 
they restrict their analysis to cases that involve a merger among a subset of 
downstream firms. My approach differs from theirs in several important ways. I 
analyse a range of bargaining structures, including bargaining over a uniform input 
price and bargaining over a two-part tariff – and I find that profitability and 
welfare effects are very different in the two cases. Moreover, since my focus is 
more generally on the effects of changes in the intensity of competition in an 
industry rather than just on mergers, I compare various competitive regimes that 
affect symmetrically all firms in the downstream industry. Finally, I provide a 
more extensive and systematic analysis of welfare results.4
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the case of 
bargaining over a uniform input price, while in section 3 I introduce two-part 
tariffs. In both cases, I identify conditions under which standard welfare results of 
                                                 
3 Lommerud et al. (2005a) discuss the case of ‘efficient’ bargaining in the working 
paper version of their paper. For reasons that I discuss below, I focus instead on 
bargaining over linear or two-part tariffs. 
4 Bergès-Sennou and Caprice (2004) examine the effect of joint profit maximisation 
in the product market on wages and employment (but not on welfare) in a model 
where firms also compete for skilled workers in the labour market. They show that 
joint profit maximisation in the product market leads to higher wages for skilled 
workers. My approach is very different. Instead of assuming that firms compete in the 
labour market, I use a bargaining framework to model the interaction between 
upstream agents and downstream firms. 
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oligopoly theory are reversed, i.e. conditions under which less competition reduces 
profits and/or increases consumer surplus and total welfare. The final section 
concludes.  
 
2. The benchmark model with bargaining over the input price. 
Consider an industry with two firms, each producing and selling to consumers one 
variety of a differentiated product. Preferences are described by the utility function 
of a representative consumer5
.)()( 21
2
2
2
121 MxxxxxxU +−+−+= βσβα    (1) 
The xi’s are the quantities demanded of the different varieties of the product in 
question, while  denotes expenditure on outside goods. The 
parameter σ, σ∈(0,2), is an inverse measure of the (exogenous) degree of horizontal 
product differentiation: in the limit as σ → 0 the goods become independent, while in 
the limit as σ → 2 they become perfect substitutes. Finally, α and β are positive scale 
parameters. 
2211 xpxpYM −−=
The inverse demand function for variety i is given by 
jii xxp βσβα −−= 2    (2) 
in the region of quantity spaces where prices are positive, and the demand function is 
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+−
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x     (3) 
                                                 
5 This is a standard quadratic utility function and it has previously been used, 
sometimes with small variations, by Spence (1976), Dixit (1979), Vives (1985), 
Shaked and Sutton (1990), Sutton (1997, 1998), and Symeonidis (2002a, 2002b), 
among others. 
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in the region of prices where quantities are positive. Let firm i have marginal cost of 
production wi, where wi < α. In particular, assume that only one input, L, is used in 
the production of variety i and has a unit price equal to wi. This input can be labour, in 
which case wi is the wage rate; or it can be an intermediate product sold by upstream 
manufacturers to downstream manufacturers; or it can be the final product, in which 
case the downstream firms are distributors. In any case, there are constant returns to 
scale, so that xi = Li.  
Competition in the industry is described by a two-stage game as follows.6 At 
stage 1, each downstream firm i forms a bargaining unit with an upstream agent 
(firm or union) and bargains over wi. Although each bargain is independent, there 
is also interaction at this stage: the set of wi that we obtain is the outcome of a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium between the two bargaining units. At stage 2, the 
downstream firms compete in quantities given the values of wi from stage 1. In 
what follows I derive the pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. 
Note that the bargaining covers only the input price, not the level of output (or 
employment) of the downstream firm. This is a common assumption in the 
bilateral oligopoly literature as well as in models of union-firm bargaining (as it is 
consistent with much of the empirical evidence). The case of bargaining over both 
                                                 
6 See also Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Dowrick (1989), Dobson (1997), Petrakis and 
Vlassis (2000) and Naylor (2002), among others. Correa-Lopez and Naylor (2004) 
compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibria of this game when bargaining is over linear 
tariffs. Inderst and Wey (2002, 2003) and Milliou et al. (2003) allow for a more 
complex bargaining process between downstream and upstream firms. All these 
papers analyse models with a similar structure to the one presented here (i.e. 
multistage oligopoly games with a bargaining stage followed by a product market 
competition stage), but none of them examines the welfare effects of the intensity of 
competition among (downstream) firms. 
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input price and output is discussed briefly in my concluding remarks. I also 
assume in this section that the input prices are linear tariffs. Two-part tariffs are 
discussed in section 3. 
Two different ways of modelling the intensity of competition between 
downstream firms will be used below. The first is standard and involves comparing 
the joint monopoly outcome with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage 
subgame. The second is an attempt to allow for a continuum of degrees of 
competition and involves assuming that at the second-stage subgame each firm 
maximises the sum of its own profit and a fraction λ of the profit of its rival. The 
parameter λ, λ∈[0,1], is an inverse measure of the intensity of competition, with λ = 0 
corresponding to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and λ = 1 corresponding to joint 
profit maximisation. Intermediate values of λ could represent imperfect collusion – 
and may be justified by reference to some implicit dynamic model of collusion, a 
reduced-form representation of which is the quantity competition subgame of the 
present model.7  The parameter λ was named ‘coefficient of cooperation’ by Cyert 
                                                 
7 For instance, a well-known result in oligopoly theory states that any individually 
rational and feasible payoff vector can be sustained as an equilibrium of an infinitely 
repeated game if the players are sufficiently patient. Alternatively, one can assume 
that firms always achieve the highest level of collusion that is sustainable given a 
number of exogenous parameters; under this interpretation, a fall in λ might 
correspond to a lower critical discount factor in an infinitely repeated game. See, for 
instance, Dal Bo (2002) for a model of a repeated game where the level of collusive 
prices and profits increases with the discount factor. Note also that the parameter λ is 
free from some of the theoretical problems encountered in other approaches to 
modelling the intensity of competition by way of a reduced-form parameter, such as 
the conjectural variations approach. 
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and deGroot (1973) and has been used in oligopoly models also by Shubik (1980), 
Brod and Shivakumar (1999) and Symeonidis (2000), among others. 
What also justifies the use of λ as a reduced-form competition parameter is its 
properties in the final-stage subgame: it can be checked that the equilibrium price, 
price-cost margin and profit in the second-stage subgame increase and the equilibrium 
quantity falls as λ rises (the intensity of competition decreases). These properties 
contrast with the properties of σ, which has often been used as a measure of 
competition. It can be checked that a fall in σ, i.e. an increase in the degree of product 
differentiation, increases both the equilibrium price and the equilibrium quantity in 
the second-stage subgame.8
Since the main focus of the present paper is on comparing welfare properties 
of different competitive regimes, I will keep things simple by taking these regimes as 
exogenous. The exogeneity of λ is not an unreasonable assumption, given the well-
known multiplicity of possible equilibria in models of infinitely repeated games. 
Moreover, the exogeneity assumption is justifiable in various empirical contexts – for 
instance when significant changes in the intensity of competition occur as a result of 
exogenous institutional changes such as economic integration or the introduction of 
effective cartel policy.  
There is also an alternative interpretation of λ: it can be thought of as a 
measure of the degree of cross-ownership, with the case λ = 1 corresponding to a full 
merger. A positive value for λ can also result from a strategic alliance between the 
downstream firms. This interpretation, however, is not a trivial change, since it affects 
                                                 
8 This property of σ in the present model may be driven by the fact that there are 
aggregate demand effects related to the degree of horizontal product differentiation, 
and does not necessarily hold for alternative specifications of demand. 
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the behaviour of the downstream firm during the bargaining process. I discuss this 
version of the model in the concluding section (and I provide details of the results in 
the Appendix). 
At the second-stage subgame, then, firm i chooses xi to maximise 
jii λππ +=Π , where 
( ) iijiiiii xwxxxwp −−−=−= βσβαπ 2)( , (4) 
and the parameter λ, λ∈[0,1], can be thought of either as a continuous measure of the 
intensity of competition or as a discreet parameter that can take only two values, 
namely λ = 0 and λ = 1. Solving the system of the two first-order conditions and 
using also the inverse demand function we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
values of xi and pi in the second-stage subgame as functions of wi and wj: 
[ ][ ]
[ ]
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 (5) 
in the region of w spaces where  ≥ 0, ≥ 0, i = 1,2 (this is satisfied as long as 
w
ixˆ ipˆ
i and wj are not too dissimilar). Note that if wi and wj were too dissimilar, then the 
inefficient firm would have zero sales and the other firm would make monopoly 
profit. However, this case is not relevant as a potential equilibrium of the game: a 
bargaining unit would not choose a level of w at stage 1 of the game that resulted in 
zero output in the second stage.9 It can be seen that  is decreasing in wixˆ i and 
increasing in wj. Also,  is increasing in both wipˆ i and wj. 
                                                 
9 If the efficiency difference between the two firms is too large, joint profit 
maximisation does not necessarily benefit the inefficient firm. I will assume that, in 
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 At stage 1 of the game, the downstream firm i and the upstream agent (firm 
or union) i form a bargaining unit and set wi so as to maximise the Nash product  
[ ] [ ϕϕ −−−=Ω 10 ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( iiiiii xwpxww ]
                                                                                                                                           
.  (6) 
The parameter ϕ∈[0,1] is a measure of the bargaining power of the upstream agent 
relative to that of the downstream firm. It depends on the relative degrees of 
impatience and risk aversion of the two parties, so it is taken here as exogenous. 
Thus the value ϕ = 1 corresponds to the case where an upstream agent chooses wi 
to maximise its utility (and there is effectively no bargaining), while ϕ = 0 
corresponds to the case where wi is set by the downstream firm. The interpretation 
of wo depends on the identity of the upstream agent: it is either the wage that the 
union would obtain in a competitive non-unionised labour market or the unit cost 
of the upstream firm. The utility of the upstream agent is given by 
. Recall that xiii xwwU )( 0−= i = Li in this model. Hence when the upstream agent 
is a union, it aims to maximise the total rent (or the wage bill if wo = 0). When the 
upstream agent is a firm, it aims to maximise its profit.10  
Note that the downstream firm’s payoff in the Nash product is its own 
second-stage profit, i.e. cooperation between downstream firms does not extend to 
 
the event that the profit is lower under joint profit maximisation than in the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for one of the firms, a side payment will be made at stage 2 of the 
game to ensure that no firm loses out from joint profit maximisation. This will not 
affect the derivation of the symmetric equilibrium in the two-stage game. 
10 A more general utility function for the upstream agent would take the form 
, where γ∈[0,1]. When the upstream agent is a union, γ 
denotes the relative strength of union preferences for employment over wages. I set γ 
= ½ for simplicity in what follows, however the main results of this section carry 
through to the more general case, as I discuss briefly in footnote 16. 
γγ 2)1(2
0 )( iii xwwU
−−=
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the bargaining stage. The justification for this is the fact that the outcome of the 
bargaining process is difficult to modify in the short or medium term and normally 
takes the form of a contract or agreement that is renegotiated at infrequent time 
intervals. Thus reaction lags are relatively long, which makes cooperation between 
downstream firms at the bargaining stage difficult to sustain (this is essentially the 
standard argument in most of the semi-collusion literature). Moreover, the 
disagreement payoffs are equal to zero for both upstream agents and downstream 
firms, which implies that in the event of a breakdown of negotiations within 
bargaining unit i, the downstream firm i has no stake in the profit of downstream 
firm j. These assumptions seem fairly uncontroversial when the downstream firms 
are separate entities and λ is interpreted as a degree of competition parameter. If λ 
is interpreted as a measure of cross-ownership, these assumptions are not valid in 
general, although the results turn out to be similar to the benchmark results for the 
case of linear tariffs. 
 I also assume that bargaining is decentralised (i.e. each downstream firm 
bargains separately with an upstream agent) and do not allow for cooperation 
between bargaining units. Decentralised bargaining seems an obvious modelling 
choice for the case where the upstream agents are firms. Even in the case of 
unions, decentralised bargaining has long been predominant in several countries 
(such as the UK), while a trend toward more decentralised bargaining structures 
has been observed in recent years in many other countries. The justification for the 
lack of cooperation between bargaining units is essentially the same as for the lack 
of cooperation between downstream firms at the bargaining stage.11
                                                 
11 Joint profit maximisation by bargaining units would be equivalent to centralised 
bargaining (i.e. the case where the entire downstream industry bargains with the entire 
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 The first-order condition for the choice of wi by bargaining unit i can be 
written, after some manipulation, as: 
0
)ˆ(ˆ))(1(
ˆ
))(ˆ(ˆ)ˆ( 00 =∂
−∂−−+∂
∂−−+−
i
ii
ii
i
i
iiiiii w
wpxww
w
xwwwpxwp ϕϕ . (7) 
As pointed out above, the values of wi and wj that we obtain at stage 1 of the game 
are the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the two 
bargaining units. In other words, wi is the Nash solution to the bargaining problem 
between downstream firm i and its upstream agent given that both expect the input 
price wj to be agreed between downstream firm j and its upstream agent. Solving 
for the (symmetric) equilibrium we obtain: 
[ ]
K
www )()1(4)2(* 00
−+−++= αλσσλϕ , (8) 
where 
[ ] [ ]{ } .0)1(2)2()2(2)1()1(44)2( >++−+−−++−++= λσσλσϕλσϕϕσλϕK   (9) 
From equation (8) we obtain 
[ ]{ }
2
0
22 )()1(8)1()2(42*
K
ww −++−++−=∂
∂ αλσλϕσσλϕγσϕ
λ ,  (10) 
which is negative for all σ∈(0,2), ϕ∈(0,1]. This establishes our first result: 
Proposition 1. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over a 
uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the input price decreases in λ. For ϕ = 0, the 
input price is independent of λ and equal to wo. 
                                                                                                                                            
upstream industry or an industry-wide union). It is known that the competitive regime 
facing downstream firms has no effect on equilibrium outcomes under fairly general 
conditions when firms participate in centralised bargaining prior to competing in the 
downstream market (see Dowrick 1989, Dhillon and Petrakis 2002).  
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 Recall that the value λ = 0 corresponds to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
while λ = 1 corresponds to joint profit maximisation. Hence Proposition 1 implies that 
the input price is generally higher in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium than under 
joint profit maximisation by downstream firms. 
Proposition 1 holds for any values of ϕ∈(0,1], even when the upstream 
agents have all the bargaining power (ϕ = 1). This may seem counterintuitive. One 
might think that since joint profit maximisation by downstream firms increases 
downstream profit, it should allow upstream agents to appropriate a larger rent 
through a higher input price. This argument, however, fails to take into account 
the way joint profit maximisation changes the incentives of the parties during the 
negotiations through its effect on the marginal returns of a change in the input 
price. 
To understand the intuition for Proposition 1, it is necessary to examine the 
way changes in the input price affect upstream utility and downstream profit.12 
Consider first the downstream firm’s incentives during the negotiations. A unit 
increase in wi always decreases the equilibrium profit of downstream firm i when 
starting from a symmetric equilibrium with wi = wj. Moreover, the effect of a unit 
change in wi on profit is larger (in absolute value) the higher the value of λ, i.e. 
.0
ˆ
wwwat
w jii
i ==>∂
∂
∂
∂ π
λ  This result is driven by the fact that an increase in 
the input price of one downstream firm shifts production to the other downstream 
firm and this effect is stronger when downstream competition is not intense. Thus 
                                                 
12 See Correa-López and Naylor (2004) and Lommerud et al. (2005a) for a related 
argument, and Symeonidis (2000) for an analogous mechanism in the context of a 
vertical differentiation model. 
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each downstream firm has a stronger incentive to avoid a high input price and will 
be more resistant to any increase in w proposed by its upstream agent the higher 
the value of λ (assuming that the downstream firm has some bargaining power, i.e. 
for ϕ ≠ 1; if the downstream firm has no bargaining power, then the mechanism 
just described is not relevant). This contributes to input prices being lower the 
higher the value of λ. 
Consider next the upstream agent’s point of view. An increase in wi raises 
the utility of the upstream agent for any given level of output. However, the higher 
the value of λ, the lower the level of output, and therefore the lower the effect of a 
unit increase in wi on the utility of the upstream agent.  As a result, the upstream 
agent will be less keen to achieve a high w the higher the value of λ. Furthermore, 
an increase in wi reduces the equilibrium output of downstream firm i and thus 
decreases the utility of its upstream agent. Now the effect of a unit change in wi on 
output is larger (in absolute value) the higher the value of λ, i.e. 0ˆ >∂
∂
∂
∂
i
i
w
x
λ . For 
this reason too each upstream agent will be more reluctant to propose an increase 
in w the higher the value of λ. These mechanisms reinforce the mechanism 
working through the effect of w on downstream profit. As a result, input prices are 
lower the higher the value of λ. 
Proposition 1 raises the possibility that the welfare effects of competition 
are different in the present model than in a standard oligopoly model where input 
prices are taken as exogenous. Equilibrium consumer surplus, aggregate downstream 
profit, and aggregate upstream agent utility are, respectively, given as 
**2*)(*)(2*2* 22 xpxxxCS −−−= βσβα   (11) 
**)*(2Π* xwp −=   (12) 
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and 
*)*(2* 0 xwwU −= , (13) 
where x* and p* are the equilibrium values of x and p in the two-stage game and 
are given by equations (5) after setting wi = wj = w*: 
[ ] .)1(4
)2*)((**,
)1(4
** λσ
σλα
λσβ
α
++
+−+=++
−= wwpwx   (14) 
The next result shows that consumer surplus may be higher or lower at the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium than under joint profit maximisation: 
Proposition 2. Suppose that downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over 
a uniform input price and the products are close substitutes. Then consumer 
surplus is higher under joint profit maximisation by downstream firms than at the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium if upstream agents have significant bargaining power. 
Consumer surplus is higher at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium than under joint 
profit maximisation if upstream agents have little bargaining power. 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 Note that Proposition 2 holds when σ is close to 2. On the other hand, it is 
easy to check that in the limit as σ → 0 (i.e. as the products become independent), 
consumer surplus is always higher at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium than under 
joint profit maximisation.13 For intermediate values of σ, numerical results suggest 
that Proposition 2 holds as long as the products are not too differentiated. 
                                                 
13 To show this, note first that for σ = 0, )1(*)0(* === λλ CSCS . Then take the 
derivative of )1(*)0(* =−= λλ CSCS  with respect to σ and evaluate it at σ = 0. The 
resulting expression is positive, hence )1(*)0(* =>= λλ CSCS  for σ close to 0. 
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 The intuition for Proposition 2 should be clear in light of Proposition 1. The 
total effect of a change in λ on consumer surplus is λλλ ∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂= *
*
w
w
CSCS
d
dCS
. The 
first term on the right-hand-side captures the direct effect of a change in the intensity 
of competition on consumer surplus, while the second term captures the indirect effect 
working through the change in the input price. It is straightforward to check that λ∂
∂CS
 
< 0 and 
*w
CS
∂
∂
 < 0, and we also know that λ∂
∂ *w
 ≤ 0, so the total effect can be 
ambiguous. As it turns out, when the products are not too differentiated (σ is close 
to 2) and the upstream agents have significant bargaining power (ϕ is large), the 
indirect positive effect of less intense competition on consumer surplus dominates 
the direct negative effect.14  
 I now consider the effect of competition on the aggregate downstream profit. 
For any given input price, aggregate downstream profit is higher the lower the 
intensity of competition – a standard result in oligopoly models with fixed input 
prices and number of varieties. Since the equilibrium input price in the present 
model is generally lower the lower the intensity of competition, and a lower input 
price raises downstream profit, it is clear that the standard result will be reinforced: 
Proposition 3. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over a 
uniform input price, the aggregate profit of the downstream firms increases in λ 
for all λ∈[0,1). 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
                                                 
14 The reason is that )1(*)0(* =−= λλ ww  is larger when σ and ϕ are large. 
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It is easy to check that the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate 
downstream profit will be higher under joint profit maximisation than at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium when ϕ is large and the products are not too differentiated. 
Next, I examine the effect of the competitive regime on the utility of the 
upstream agents. The effect of a change in λ on aggregate upstream agent utility can 
be decomposed into three different effects as follows: 
.*
*
*)*(2*)*(2**2* 00 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂−+∂
∂−+∂
∂=∂
∂
λλλλ
w
w
xwwxwwwxU  (15) 
The first term stands for the effect of a change in λ on the equilibrium input price 
w*. As we know from Proposition 1, this effect is negative (or, in a special case, 
zero). The second term captures the direct effect of a change in λ on the 
equilibrium level of output x*. This term is also negative, since output is lower the 
higher the value of λ for any given level of w. The third term captures the indirect 
effect of a change in λ on x* that works through the change in the input price. 
Since we have 
*
*
w
x
∂
∂
 < 0 and λ∂
∂ *w
 ≤ 0, this term is positive or zero. However, this 
effect is a second-order one, and λ∂∂ *U  is negative in the present model:  
Proposition 4. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over a 
uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the aggregate upstream agent utility decreases in 
λ. For ϕ = 0, the upstream agent utility is independent of λ (and equal to zero). 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
Finally, overall welfare is given by **** UCSW +Π+= . We obtain: 
Proposition 5. Suppose that downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over 
a uniform input price and the products are close substitutes. Then total welfare is 
higher under joint profit maximisation by downstream firms than at the Cournot-
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Nash equilibrium if upstream agents have significant bargaining power. Total 
welfare is higher at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium than under joint profit 
maximisation if upstream agents have little bargaining power. 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
Note that Proposition 5 holds when σ is sufficiently large. On the other hand, 
it is easy to check that in the limit as σ → 0, welfare is always higher at the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium than under joint profit maximisation.15  16
 
3. Bargaining over two-part tariffs. 
The assumption that input prices are linear tariffs may be somewhat restrictive, 
especially when the upstream agents are firms, given that uniform price contracts 
are generally inefficient and upstream firms are less constrained than unions by 
institutional or other factors when specifying a contract with downstream firms. 
This does not invalidate the approach adopted in the previous section since 
uniform price contracts are widely observed in practice. Still, one would want to 
                                                 
15 To show this, note first that for σ = 0, )1(*)0(* === λλ WW . Then evaluate the 
derivative of )1(*)0(* =−= λλ WW  with respect to σ at σ = 0. The resulting 
expression is positive, hence )1(*)0(* =>= λλ WW  for σ close to 0. 
16 Propositions 1, 3 and 4 still hold when the upstream agent’s utility function takes 
the form , for γ∈[0,1) (when γ = 1, w* = wγγ 2)1(20 )( iii xwwU −−= o). Propositions 2 
and 5 are modified in this case in the sense that consumer surplus is now higher under 
joint profit maximisation than at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when ϕ and σ are 
sufficiently large and γ is small, while total welfare is higher under joint profit 
maximisation when ϕ and σ are large and γ takes intermediate values.  
When firms set prices rather than quantities in the second-stage subgame, 
propositions 1, 3 and 4 still hold, but propositions 2 and 5 do not: consumer surplus 
and overall welfare are always higher the lower the value of λ. 
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analyse how the results described in the previous section might change when one 
allows for non-linear price contracts between upstream agents and downstream 
firms. Although this analysis may seem more relevant when the upstream agents 
are firms (especially when there are close relationships between downstream firms 
and upstream suppliers, which is the case examined in this paper), it is also 
possible to interpret this case as a union-firm bargain, where there is a “lump-
sum” payment to the union or a non-monetary benefit such as an improvement in 
working conditions which has a monetary equivalent in the form of a fixed fee. 
In this section I extend the basic model of the previous section to allow for 
bargaining over two-part tariffs. The structure of demand is the same as in the 
previous section, but the profit function of downstream firm i is now given by 
iiiii Fxwp −−= )(π , where Fi ≥ 0 is a lump sum transfer from downstream firm i 
to its upstream agent.17 At stage 2 of the two-stage game, the downstream firms 
compete in quantities given the unit input prices and fixed fees set at stage 1.18 I 
allow for different degrees of competition in the second-stage subgame. At stage 
1, each downstream firm i bargains independently over wi and Fi with an upstream 
agent. The values of wi and Fi are chosen so as to maximise  
[ ] [ ϕϕ −−−+−=Ω 10 ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( iiiiiiii FxwpFxww ]
                                                
, (16) 
taking as given the values of wj and Fj (that is, wi, wj, Fi and Fj are the outcome of 
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the two bargaining units).  
 
17 There are similarities between the two-part tariff case examined here and the 
literature on managerial incentives in oligopoly (see Fershtman and Judd 1987, 
Sklivas 1987). 
18 The main results of this section (propositions 6 and 7) are robust to price-setting by 
downstream firms. 
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In this context, although the objective of each party in the negotiations 
within a bargaining unit is to maximise its own profit and there is no cooperation 
at the bargaining stage, there are two instruments at the disposal of downstream 
firms and upstream agents. Hence wi will be chosen to maximise the joint profit of 
the bargaining unit (and will therefore be independent of ϕ), while the fixed fee will 
be determined by the respective bargaining power of the parties. Solving for the 
(symmetric) equilibrium, we obtain:  
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Straightforward calculations yield: 
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λσσβ
αλσϕϕσσλσσ
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wF , (20) 
for all σ∈(0,2), λ∈[0,1] and ϕ∈[0,1]. Hence: 
Proposition 6. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over two-
part tariffs, the unit input price decreases and the fixed fee increases in λ. 
The intuition for the first part of Proposition 6 is similar to that already 
discussed for the case of bargaining over a uniform input price. In particular, both 
the downstream firm and the upstream agent within each bargaining unit will be 
more reluctant to propose or accept increases in w the higher the value of λ 
because of the effect this will have on their joint profit. As a result, the unit input 
 21
price will be lower the higher the value of λ. On the other hand, the level of the 
fixed fee has no effect on output, and its effect on upstream utility and 
downstream profit is independent of the competitive regime. The reason for the 
positive effect of λ on F is that a decrease in the intensity of competition generates 
more rents overall (through both a direct market power effect and an indirect 
effect due to the lower unit input price) and the upstream agents can then 
appropriate more of those rents through a higher fixed fee. 
Equilibrium consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit, and aggregate 
upstream utility are, respectively, given as 
****2*)*(*)*(2**2** 22 xpxxxCS −−−= βσβα   (21) 
**2***)***(2**Π Fxwp −−=   (22) 
and 
**2**)**(2** 0 FxwwU +−= , (23) 
where p** and x** are given by equations (5) after setting wi = wj = w**: 
[ ] .)1(4
)2*)(*(****,
)1(4
**** λσ
σλα
λσβ
α
++
+−+=++
−= wwpwx   (24) 
Note that consumer surplus, total profit (Π** + U**) and total welfare (CS** + 
Π** + U**) are independent of F** and hence also of ϕ. This is due to the fact 
that (i) changes in fixed costs have no effect on marginal costs or quantities 
produced at equilibrium, and (ii) marginal costs are independent of the relative 
bargaining power of upstream agents and downstream firms because the use of 
two-part tariffs leads to joint profit maximisation by each bargaining unit. 
The welfare effects of a change in the intensity of competition are, in 
principle, ambiguous when downstream firms bargain with upstream agents over 
two-part tariffs. Take, first, consumer surplus. Although this is independent of the 
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fixed fee, it is a function of the input price. The total effect of a change in λ on 
consumer surplus is the sum of a direct effect and an indirect effect, the latter working 
through the change in the input price. The former effect is negative, while the latter is 
positive, so the total effect is potentially ambiguous. If the effect of λ on the 
equilibrium input price is sufficiently strong, consumer surplus will increase when 
competition is less intense. 
The aggregate downstream profit depends not only on output sold and the unit 
input price w, but also on the fixed fee F. For any given input price and fixed fee, 
aggregate downstream profit is always higher when competition is less intense – a 
standard result in oligopoly theory. Moreover, the equilibrium unit input price falls 
as λ rises in the present model, and a lower input price raises downstream profit, thus 
reinforcing the standard result. However, the equilibrium fixed fee rises as λ rises, and 
a higher fixed fee reduces downstream profit, thus working against the standard result. 
Hence the overall effect of a change in λ on downstream profit can be ambiguous, 
depending on the relative strength of the direct effect and the two indirect effects 
mentioned above. If the effect working through the fixed fee is sufficiently strong, the 
standard result of oligopoly theory will be reversed.  
Finally, consider the effect of a change in the competitive regime on 
upstream utility. This effect can be decomposed into four different effects as 
follows: 
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The first three terms are already familiar and their signs are the same as in the 
previous section. The fourth term captures the (positive) effect of a change in λ on 
F**. The overall effect of a change in λ on U** is potentially ambiguous. 
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As it turns out, all these effects are unambiguous in the present model. 
Moreover, they are the opposite of those obtained from standard oligopoly models 
with exogenous marginal costs and number of varieties. In particular: 
Proposition 7. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over two-
part tariffs and ϕ∈(0,1): 
(i) The aggregate downstream profit and the aggregate upstream utility both 
decrease in λ. 
(ii) Consumer surplus, the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate 
downstream profit, and total welfare all increase in λ. 
Proof. From equations (17), (18), (21), (22), (23) and (24) we obtain: 
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It is easy to check that: 
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∂
λ
U  and 
0*)*****( >∂
+Π+∂
λ
UCS ,  (29) 
for all σ∈(0,2), λ∈[0,1] and ϕ∈(0,1).   
 Note that when ϕ = 1, Π** is always equal to zero and all the other results are 
the same as above. When ϕ = 0, U** is always equal to zero and all the other results 
are the same as above. 
 24
In summary, we obtain a complete reversal of the standard results of 
oligopoly theory. Less intense competition in the downstream market reduces both 
downstream profit and upstream utility.19 It is worth emphasising that this is true 
for downstream profit as well, as it is the opposite of what we have obtained in 
section 2 for the case of linear tariffs. Moreover, less intense competition in the 
downstream market increases consumer surplus, the sum of consumer surplus and 
downstream profit, and total welfare. Although these results have been derived here in 
the context of a duopoly with linear demand, the mechanisms that drive them are 
much more general.  
Why do the welfare effects of downstream competition depend on whether 
bargaining is over a two-part tariff or a linear tariff? Two remarks are in order. First, 
the introduction of a fixed fee implies that there is an additional indirect effect of a 
decrease in the intensity of competition between downstream firms on downstream 
profit (but not on consumer surplus), working through the change in the fixed fee. 
This effect – which is absent when bargaining is over a linear tariff – is negative, 
since a larger fixed fee decreases the profit of the downstream industry and the fixed 
fee is larger the higher the value of λ. This is the reason why downstream profit 
decreases in λ when bargaining is over a two-part tariff (Proposition 7), even though 
it increases in λ when bargaining is over a linear tariff (Proposition 3). 
Second, the introduction of a fixed fee implies that each bargaining unit can be 
more efficient in its choice of a unit input price. In particular, the equilibrium unit 
input price is lower than it would have been in the absence of the fixed fee (in fact, it 
                                                 
19 A similar result is often found in models of semi-collusion. Of course, downstream 
firms would prefer less intense competition once the bargaining with the upstream 
agents is over: for given two-part tariffs, downstream profit increases in λ.  
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is lower than w0). A lower input price increases consumer surplus, everything else 
being equal. It follows that the indirect effect of a change in λ on consumer surplus 
working through the change in the unit input price is stronger when bargaining is over 
a two-part tariff than when it is over a linear tariff. Now recall that this indirect effect 
is the reason why less intense competition between downstream firms may cause 
consumer surplus to rise in a bargaining framework. Hence consumer surplus always 
increases in λ when there is bargaining over a two-part tariff (Proposition 6), although 
it may increase or decrease in λ when there is bargaining over a linear tariff 
(Proposition 2). 
 
4. Concluding remarks. 
I have analysed the welfare effects of changes in the intensity of competition between 
downstream firms when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream 
agents (firms or unions) over a linear tariff or over a two-part tariff. There was no 
scope for innovation or productivity improvements in the present model, so the focus 
was on static welfare results. I have then identified circumstances where a reduction 
in the intensity of competition may have unexpected welfare implications, such as a 
reduction in profit and/or an increase in consumer surplus and total welfare. 
While joint profit maximisation has been described here as an extreme case 
of ‘soft’ competition among firms, it could also be seen as the result of a merger or 
strategic alliance between downstream firms. More generally, an alternative 
interpretation of the parameter λ is as a measure of the degree of cross-ownership 
in the downstream market, with λ = 1 corresponding to a full merger. This 
interpretation changes the payoffs at the bargaining stage of the game to the extent 
that the degree of cross-ownership must be specified before the bargaining stage. 
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In particular, at the bargaining stage the downstream firm’s payoff in the Nash 
product is no longer its own second-stage profit and the disagreement payoff for 
the downstream firm is no longer zero.20 As shown in the Appendix, all the results 
in section 2 (on linear tariffs) are robust to this change of interpretation, although 
the results in section 3 (on two-part tariffs) are not.21 In other words, a (profitable) 
merger between the downstream firms in a vertical duopoly may raise consumer 
surplus and total welfare when bargaining is over linear tariffs. 
I have not analysed in this paper the case where not only the input price but 
also the level of output (or employment) is determined through bargaining. 
However, it is clear that the input price cannot be lower under joint profit 
maximisation by downstream firms than at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in this 
case. When the input price and the level of output are set simultaneously rather than 
sequentially, the choice of input price is not complicated by strategic considerations, 
so the mechanism I have described in this paper to provide intuition for Proposition 1 
(and other results) is no longer relevant. Instead, w is now higher the lower the 
intensity of competition simply because there are then more rents to be shared 
between upstream agents and downstream firms for any given level of w. 
                                                 
20 For instance, when bargaining is over linear tariffs, at stage 1 of the game the 
downstream firm i and the upstream agent i choose wi to maximise the Nash 
product [ ] [ ] ,)(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ λλ −−−−+−−=Ω jjjjjjiiiiii xwpxwpxwpxww  taking 
the value of wj as given, where , ,  and  are given in equations (5) and ipˆ ixˆ jpˆ jxˆ
jp  and jx  are the price and output of good j in the case of a bargaining conflict 
between the downstream firm i and upstream agent i.  
21 Note that although Proposition 1 still holds under this alternative interpretation, the 
intuition is now somewhat different: the result hinges to a large extent on a standard 
countervailing power effect.  
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Furthermore, output is lower the less intense the competition for essentially the same 
reason as in the standard oligopoly model with exogenous costs, namely because 
bargaining units can boost joint profits by restricting output for any given level of w. 
These effects imply that the effect of competition on consumer surplus and overall 
welfare will be similar to the standard welfare results of oligopoly theory.  
An important assumption of the model is that a downstream firm and its 
upstream agent are already locked into bilateral relations when they bargain over 
the input price. This assumption is fairly uncontroversial when the upstream 
agents are unions (see the discussion in Horn and Wolinsky 1988). One way to 
justify this assumption when the upstream agents are firms is to assume that, prior 
to reaching an agreement on price, the two parties have already made some 
relation-specific investments that prevent them from breaking up. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that these investments might represent very long-run 
decisions, while decisions about the bargained input price are easier to reverse in 
the medium term.22 If so, the structure of the game analysed in the present paper is 
valid whatever the identity of the upstream agent. 
Although some of the specific welfare results of the present model may be 
due to its particular structure and the functional forms used, many of the economic 
mechanisms than underlie these results are far more general. For instance, the fact 
that the bargained input price is lower when competition is less intense is crucial but it 
is not specific to the linear demand system or even to the presence of bargaining. A 
lower input price under joint profit maximisation will also obtain when downstream 
                                                 
22 Even when a basic input price is specified in a long-term contract between an 
upstream and a downstream firm prior to any relation-specific investment being made, 
the contract needs to allow for some flexibility, so discounts and even the basic input 
price are likely to be subject to regular renegotiation.  
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firms are facing an upward-sloping supply curve for their input under conditions of 
perfect competition in the input market. Joint profit maximisation by downstream 
firms would then result in a lower level of output, thus reducing the demand for inputs 
and therefore also the input price. Within a bargaining framework, Dowrick (1989) 
has argued that the effect of collusion among firms on wages is ambiguous because 
of two opposing effects: on the one hand, collusion increases profit margins and 
hence the ability of unions to push for higher wages; on the other hand, collusion 
reduces output and increases competition among unions for shares in employment, 
and this tends to push wages down. 
Moreover, the fact that the bargained input price is lower when competition is 
less intense is not specific to the particular way the intensity of competition has been 
modelled in this paper, although it is not a general property either. For instance, an 
alternative way of modelling an increase in the intensity of competition is through an 
increase in the number of firms in a Cournot (or Bertrand) oligopoly. It is easy to 
check that in the present model the equilibrium bargained unit input price can be 
increasing in the number of firms when bargaining is over two-part tariffs (but not in 
the case of linear tariffs – see also Naylor 2002).23
Clearly, there are a number of mechanisms that could lead to input prices 
being lower when competition is less intense and the present paper has simply 
formalised this idea through the use a reduced-form measure of competition. The 
                                                 
23 In the Cournot case, this will occur when products are not too differentiated and the 
number of firms not too small. For instance, for σ = 1 the input price increases in the 
number of firms whenever there are at least 5 firms in the market. However, the 
indirect negative effect of competition on consumer surplus and welfare working 
through the change in the input price is always dominated by the direct positive effect 
when competition is modelled in this way.  
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empirical evidence supports this result. In particular, while the evidence on the effects 
of mergers on wages is somewhat mixed, most studies find a negative effect (see 
Lommerud et al. 2006 for a brief review). Moreover, Symeonidis (2007) examines the 
effects of collusion across UK manufacturing industries in the 1950s and 1960s and 
finds no evidence of any overall effect on wages of manual or non-manual 
workers. On the whole, then, the empirical evidence is consistent with the view 
that less intense competition may reduce wages in certain circumstances or in 
some industries. It follows that there are circumstances where less intense 
competition will be beneficial for consumers and for society as a whole, at least in the 
absence of any significant positive effects of competition on innovation or 
productivity. The aim of the present paper was to shed more light on the conditions 
under which we may need to qualify the conventional economic wisdom on the 
welfare effects of competition. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. From equations (8), (11) and (14) we obtain 
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Proof of Proposition 3. The total effect of a change in λ on downstream profit is 
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Proof of Proposition 4. Rearranging the expression in (15), we obtain: 
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Since λ∂
∂ *x
 < 0 and λ∂
∂ *w
 < 0 for all ϕ∈(0,1], we only need to show that the term in 
brackets is positive in order to prove that λ∂∂ *U  < 0. Let H denote that term. Using 
(8) and (14) we obtain 
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Hence H is positive for all σ∈(0,2), λ∈[0,1], ϕ∈(0,1]. When ϕ = 0, equation (8) gives 
w = wo, and hence U* = 0.           
 
Proof of Proposition 5. From equations (8), (11), (12), (13) and (14) we obtain 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
An alternative interpretation of the parameter λ is as a measure of the degree of 
cross-ownership in the downstream market, with λ = 1 corresponding to a full 
merger. This interpretation changes the payoffs in the bargaining stage of the 
game to the extent that the degree of cross-ownership must be specified before the 
bargaining stage. (I assume that the degree of cross-ownership is determined 
exogenously; it can, of course, be endogenised, but this is beyond the scope of this 
Appendix.) In particular, at the bargaining stage the downstream firm’s payoff in 
the Nash product can no longer be its own second-stage profit and the 
disagreement payoff for the downstream firm can no longer be zero. 
Linear tariffs. More specifically, if λ represents the degree of cross-
ownership in the downstream market and bargaining is over linear tariffs, the final 
stage of the game is as before, while at stage 1 of the game the downstream firm i 
and the upstream agent i choose wi to maximise the Nash product  
[ ] [ ] ,)(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ λλ −−−−+−−=Ω jjjjjjiiiiii xwpxwpxwpxww   (A8) 
taking the value of wj as given, where , ,  and  are given in equations 
(5) and 
ipˆ ixˆ jpˆ jxˆ
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j
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w
x
−=  are the price and output of good j in the 
case of a bargaining conflict between the downstream firm i and upstream agent i. 
(In the case of full merger, the merged firm bargains simultaneously with each 
upstream agent.) I still assume here that each upstream agent is locked into 
relations with one downstream firm – and in the case of a full merger, with one of 
the divisions of the merged firm. For example, the upstream agents could be 
unions organised at plant level. The difference with the case examined in section 2 
of the paper is that the downstream firm now seeks to maximise its aggregate 
second-stage profit minus its disagreement payoff. 
The first-order condition for the choice of wi by bargaining unit i can be 
written as: 
 33
.0
)ˆ(
ˆ
ˆ
)ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ
ˆ
)ˆ(ˆ))(1(
ˆ
ˆ
)(
8
)(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(
0
0
2
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
−∂+∂
∂−+∂
−∂+∂
∂−−−+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +∂
∂−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+−
i
jj
j
i
j
jj
i
ii
i
i
i
iiii
i
i
i
i
i
jjjiii
w
wp
x
w
x
wp
w
wpx
w
xwpxww
x
w
xwwwxwpxwp
λλϕ
β
αλλϕ
          (A9) 
Solving for the (symmetric) equilibrium we obtain: 
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From equation (A10) we obtain 
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which is negative for all σ∈(0,2), ϕ∈(0,1]. Hence: 
Proposition A1. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over a 
uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the input price decreases in the degree of cross-
ownership λ. For ϕ = 0, the input price is independent of λ and equal to wo. 
 Proposition A1 mirrors Proposition 1, but the intuition is now somewhat 
different. In particular, the result now hinges to a large extent on a standard 
countervailing power effect. Compare, for simplicity, the case λ = 0 with the case 
λ = 1. A merged downstream firm has an incentive to force the unit input price 
down to increase its profit. And, crucially, it is able to do so because it can play 
one upstream agent against the other in the negotiations. As for the upstream 
agents, they are unable to resist a low w even though this is detrimental to their 
profits. On the other hand, when the downstream firms are independent, they still 
benefit from a lower unit input price but they cannot afford to put too much 
pressure on their respective upstream agents – and hence these are in a better 
position to resist a low w. 
Welfare results can be easily obtained using equations (11)-(14) of the 
main text together with (A10). As it turns out, they are similar to those derived in 
section 2. Consider, first, consumer surplus: 
Proposition A2. Suppose that downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over 
a uniform input price and the products are close substitutes. Then consumer 
surplus is higher under a merger between downstream firms than when 
downstream firms are independent if upstream agents have significant bargaining 
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power. Consumer surplus is higher when downstream firms are independent than 
under a merger if upstream agents have little bargaining power. 
Proof. From equations (11), (14) and (A10) we obtain 
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depending on the values of σ and ϕ. It is easy to check that ΔCS*(σ = 2) = 
2
2
0
2
)4(144
))(55184112(
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αϕϕ
−
−+− w
 < 0 for all ϕ∈(0.8,1]. By continuity, ΔCS* < 0 when σ 
→ 2 and ϕ is large enough, while ΔCS* > 0 when σ → 2 and ϕ is small.    
 Note that Proposition A2 holds when σ is close to 2. On the other hand, for σ 
close to 0, consumer surplus is always higher when downstream firms are 
independent than under a merger between downstream firms. 
The next result is straightforward: 
Proposition A3. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over a 
uniform input price, the aggregate profit of the downstream firms increases in the 
degree of cross-ownership λ for all λ∈[0,1). 
The effect of a change in λ on upstream agent utility can again be 
decomposed into three different effects as shown in equation (15). We obtain:  
Proposition A4. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over a 
uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the aggregate upstream agent utility decreases in 
the degree of cross-ownership λ. For ϕ = 0, the upstream agent utility is 
independent of λ (and equal to zero). 
Proof. Rearranging the expression in (15), we obtain: 
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Since λ∂
∂ *x
 < 0 and λ∂
∂ *w
 < 0 for all ϕ∈(0,1], we only need to show that the term in 
brackets is positive in order to prove that λ∂∂ *U  < 0. Let J denote that term. Using 
(A10) and (14) we obtain 
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which is positive for all σ∈(0,2), λ∈[0,1] and ϕ∈(0,1]. When ϕ = 0, equation 
(A10) gives w = wo, and hence U* = 0.        
Finally, overall welfare can be higher or lower under a downstream merger: 
Proposition A5. Suppose that downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over 
a uniform input price and the products are close substitutes. Then total welfare is 
higher under a merger between downstream firms than when downstream firms 
are independent if upstream agents have significant bargaining power. Total welfare 
is higher when downstream firms are independent than under a merger if upstream 
agents have little bargaining power. 
Proof. From equations (11)-(14) and (A10) we obtain 
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2 and ϕ is large enough, while ΔW* > 0 when σ → 2 and ϕ is small.    
Proposition A5 holds when σ is sufficiently large. On the other hand, for small 
values of σ, consumer surplus is always higher when downstream firms are 
independent than under a merger between downstream firms. 
Two-part tariffs. Now consider bargaining over two-part tariffs and let λ 
denote the degree of cross-ownership in the downstream market. The final stage of 
the game is as before, while at stage 1 each downstream firm i bargains 
independently over wi and Fi with an upstream agent, taking as given the values of 
wj and Fj. (If λ = 1, the merged firm bargains simultaneously with each upstream 
agent.) The Nash product is 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ,)(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ λλ −−−−−−+−−+−=Ω jjjjjjjjiiiiiiii FxwpFxwpFxwpFxww
     (A18) 
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where 
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−=  are the price and output of good j in the 
case of a bargaining conflict between the downstream firm i and upstream agent i. 
In this context, wi will be chosen to maximise the sum of the profit of the 
upstream agent i and the aggregate profit of the downstream firm i minus the 
disagreement payoff of the downstream firm: 
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Moreover, the value of the fixed fee will be determined by the respective bargaining 
power of the parties. Solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we obtain: 
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for all σ∈(0,2) and ϕ∈[0,1]. Hence: 
Proposition A6. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over two-
part tariffs, the unit input price is lower and the fixed fee higher when downstream 
firms are independent than under a merger between downstream firms. 
This is the opposite of the result obtained in section 3 (Proposition 6) and 
also the opposite of the result obtained for the case of linear tariffs above 
(Proposition A1). The intuition is as follows. First, note that under two-part tariffs 
the unit input price is set below w0, so each upstream agent is effectively 
subsidising the downstream firm (and using the fixed fee to compensate for this 
subsidy). Now a decrease in wi leads to a decrease in the output of product j. This 
implies a decrease in the subsidy provided by upstream agent j to the downstream 
firm. Under a merger this effect is internalised, but with independent downstream 
firms it is not. As a result, the downstream firm is less keen to push for a reduction 
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in the unit input price when λ = 1 than when λ = 0. It turns out that this effect 
dominates all others when the parties set the level of the unit input price that 
maximises expression (A19).24 Furthermore, since the fixed fee F is used to 
transfer profit from the downstream industry to the upstream agents, F is lower 
when w is higher and vice versa. 
Since a merger between downstream firms increases the unit input price 
and reduces the fixed fee, it is not surprising that the welfare implications are 
similar to the standard results of oligopoly theory: 
Proposition A7. When downstream firms and upstream agents bargain over two-
part tariffs and ϕ∈(0,1): 
(i) The aggregate downstream profit increases in the degree of cross-
ownership λ. 
(ii) Consumer surplus, the aggregate upstream utility and total welfare 
decrease in the degree of cross-ownership λ. 
Proof. From equations (21)-(24), (A20) and (A21), we obtain: 
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   
                                                 
24 However, there is no reason why this effect should dominate in a model with more 
general functional forms. Note that although )1*(*)0*(* =<= λλ ww , the sign of 
λ∂
∂ **w  is ambiguous. 
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